The adage is that the team that gets the better player wins the trade. I find that an overly simplistic way of looking at things. Under this prism, it would be a knee-jerk judgement to say that the Flames won the trade, after all, Cammalleri is a star while Rene Bourque is, well not Ray Bourque. If we take their entire careers in to account, there’s no doubt that Cammalleri has been the better player. But over the course of the last 2+ seasons, Bourque has actually outscored Cammalleri. Viewed in that light, the trade is already much more even. Given that Bourque is much bigger and tougher than Cammalleri, he brings another important component that the Habs have been sorely lacking.

When news of the trade broke last night, I didn’t know what to think. I thought Cammalleri deserved to be traded, and I believe he wanted to be traded. I don’t trust Pierre Gauthier, as most Habs fans don’t. When somebody is as univerally disliked as Gauthier is, it’s easy to pan his each and every move. He’s blamed for moves that Gainey ultimately signed off on, as if he forced Gainey to trade for the Gomez’ of the world. Twitter makes for a great sounding board, but it’s prone to make people look like they have some kind of manic disorder. Such was the case with my timeline once the trade was announced. I vacillated between hating and liking the move; If Cammalleri had to go, at least make it a salary dump…make it a move about the future of the team. That wasn’t the case, and the Habs held true to their traditional modus operandi. They’re not holding a firesale, and they will not tank the season in search of a lottery pick. That was a fantasy. After marinating in the trade overnight, I woke up this morning liking it more than when I went to bed. There are reasons to NOT like it, if that’s your choosing, and I wouldn’t hold that against you if are a Cammalleri fan, but I’m opting to look at the positive aspects and run with them:

• Bourque has actually been a better scorer in recent years than Cammalleri.
• Bourque is much cheaper (although his contract runs much longer). Nevertheless, he represents good value.
• Bourque is much bigger, and that is something the Habs need very much need, especially in the dog days of the season when small guys show signs of fatigue.
• The Habs got a 2nd round pick in return, as well as a depth prospect who may turn out to be a little more than a throw-in.
• Team unity may improve with the removal of a guy who apparently was not very well liked in the room, and you can’t put a price on that.

If there’s a reason to not like the trade, it’s that Cammalleri was an elite playoff performer while in Montreal. Halak is hero #1, but Cammalleri is right there with him. Trouble is, his elite playoff production is useless if he can’t help the Canadiens get to the playoffs. Any way you slice it, 9 goals is unacceptable from Cammalleri. There’s no excuse for it. He’s been a giant bust this year, sulking around the ice and not doing what he was paid to do: score goals. Guys who come in on the heels of scoring 39 goals and who are given 30 million dollars are not paid to do anything other than score.

If there’s another reason to not like the trade, it’s the manner in how Gauthier goes about his business. He operates in a cone of silence and seems to not have a concrete idea of how to construct and maintain a team. It’s fair to say that the vast majority of Habs fans want him replaced, and perhaps some of the anger of this trade stems from the fact that we now see that he is likely not going anywhere any time soon. It appears that Molson has continued trust in Gauthier, and that makes us mad, and that casts a pall over any move that Gauthier will make. The Canadiens have long stood as an organization that carried itself with class, from top to bottom. Gauthier is sullying that reputation with his panic moves. Firing Assistant Coaches 90 minutes before a game, and other ‘save my job’ type moves are tarnishing the Canadiens, and the results are trickling down to the ice. They used to get it right nearly everywhere. Now they rarely do. There are no more ceremonies to honour the past, to show off how the Canadiens show class and reverence. The focus is on the present, and the focus is blurry.

In the end, there’s no choice but to get on board with the trade. To pray that Gauthier’s 180° turn from a mantra that asked small, skilled players to win it on the powerplay to a team that is getting bigger & grittier will eventually bring badly needed wins in a division that is quickly improving. We can also hope that it show semblance of a team that can tough it out with sandpaper in the playoffs. They won’t get there this year, but they weren’t getting there with Cammalleri, either. If team unity improves as result of a disliked player being moved, then that’s another huge, intangible plus.

For those still unaware, the Canadiens season has been, and remains in jeopardy. Truthfully, it’s been on life support since Halloween. No, that’s not a typo. On the morning of November 1st, the Canadiens were in 11th place in the Eastern Conference, a mere 2 points out of a playoff spot, and very few fans were concerned with the situation (I was). If that isn’t grounds for “life support”, then let’s call it a gestating illness. There was a lot of nonchalance among the fanbase, despite what historical precedent showed to be the harsh reality. That reality said that being outside of the top 8 on November 1st meant a tough climb to get back in. Yes, November 1st is awfully early to pronounce any conclusions for how the season will end, but history was already against the Habs.

Fast forward to January 2012, and the Canadiens have dug themselves down to 12th place in the East, 7 big, fat, bloated points out of the playoff picture. In short: they went in the wrong direction. If things were unsettling back on Halloween, they must be bleak now. Or are they?

Unbeaten in 2012 (nyuk nyuk nyuk), the Habs appear to be a new team. As Will pointed out in his piece yesterday: “early returns suggest this two-game winning streak is more than just a fluke“. Two games is certainly a short sample, but the attitude and tempo appears to be contagious. They no longer sit on leads, they no longer have poor body language, and they no longer look like the stifled, frustrated, crippled group they were under former Coach Jacques Martin. And not to be overlooked: they are no longer boring to watch. We all reserve to right to reevaluate our opinions after more games against tougher teams are in the books, but we are starting to see the team that we thought we had when it was assembled back in 2009 (and tinkered with ever since).

The big question today is whether or not this modest turnaround is “too little, too late”. The Canadiens need to rack up 53 points in their remaining 41 games to end the regular season with 92 points, which represents the average threshold needed to make the playoffs since the lockout ended. Not to be misplaced is the fact that the 8th place team is currently on pace for 94 points, making things yet again harder. The aforementioned 53pts in 41 games is a win percentage of .646 over the second half of the season. If that imposing number wasn’t enough, they have to do their damndest to earn those points in regulation and not allow Eastern opponents to grab “loser points”. That would only make the Canadiens’ task tougher still. Simply put, the Canadiens need to go at least 27-14 from here until the final siren blares on game 82. That would represent quite the reversal of fortunes, and would still only likely reap them the 8th slot in the East – if that. Making things even harder is that the Canadiens need to leapfrog 3 teams, or hope that other teams completely fall apart. The Panthers, Leafs, Sens, and now massively depleted Penguins are all common targets to have the trap door open under their feet. As of yet, none have officially fallen out of the playoff picture, and even if they do, there’s no guarantee that the Canadiens will play well enough to surpass them. Interesting to note that in the past 3 days, the Leafs beat the Wings, Senators took 3 of 4 points from the Flyers, and the Panthers beat the Canucks. If those teams are going to give up the ghost, they aren’t going to do so quietly.

Here’s where The Conundrum rears its ugly head. Is it worth it for the Canadiens to play each of their remaining games like it’s the 7th game of the Cup finals? How much would they have left in the tank for the playoffs? Sure they’d be battle-tested, but they’d also be incredibly weary. Is it worth it for Pierre Gauthier to be a buyer at the trade deadline? Is it worth it to dump assets in a potentially futile quest to grab the 8th in the East? And given that only one Cup winning team since 1994 entered the playoffs without the benefit of home ice advantage, is all of the back-breaking effort really worth it? I would say no, it is not worth it. I would hate to go through a Habs-less spring, but this hamster wheel of mediocrity has to stop. Stakeholders in the team might disagree, as would those fans who say that “you can’t win the Cup if you don’t make the playoffs“. Personally, I would allow nature to take its course, and I would trade away pending UFAs (unless Kostitsyn can be signed at the right price) for future prospects and draft choices. In the cap era, having good, young talent at a cheap price is the only way to have a perennial contender.

But what do April tee times mean for “interim” Head Coach Randy Cunneyworth? Quite simply, it would likely mean his termination, but is that not already inevitable? He’s already been thrown to the wolves by his Owner and by his General Manager. Short of long playoff run, I’m not sure that anything can secure his future as Coach of the Habs. As much as I like Cunneyworth, and as much as I believe he deserves every single opportunity to be this team’s long-term Head Coach, there’s every reason to believe that the Canadiens brass will bow to pressure from narrow minded media types and extremist fringe elements and opt yet again to take the path of appeasement rather than institute a meritocracy. That means that Cunneyworth’s future as a Coach is elsewhere, and for that reason I see no reason to sacrifice key parts of the future for what is already a virtual mission impossible.

What’s your take? Go for broke, or look to a brighter future, albeit one minus Randy Cunneyworth?

Bonus question: What if the players, as a group, tell Molson that they adore Randy Cunneyworth and want him to stick around permanently? What then? Appease the nose-out-of-joint lunatics, or keep the team happy?

It’s clear that the Canadiens are currently not living up to their own expectations. After all, they were the ones who came up with the “Rise Together” marketing campaign. What, exactly were they implying by that? Rise to where, exactly? To 8th place? 6th place? After a 2010-2011 year in which the Canadiens showed great promise, fueled by Price, Subban and Pacioretty, the team’s Marketing department may have made their first misstep in actually trying to RAISE the bar for once. They finished 6th last year, and, as the refrain goes, if they had Markov, Gorges and Pacioretty all year, they could have done better. So I assume they had higher targets this year.

Oops!

You might tell me that injuries have derailed the best laid plans, but I think that’s nothing but a lazy, old and tired excuse. Markov has been out for so long that he should no longer be factored in to the team’s plans or fortunes until he’s back in the lineup. Same goes for Campoli, a wildcard player left on the free agent scrap heap until late September. Surely, such saviours don’t rot on the scrap heap do they? The only thing we can say is that we don’t know how he would have fit in to this roster. Maybe he would have helped, maybe not. Scott Gomez, another big name and cap hit on the shelf wasn’t producing and was a drag on the team, so don’t tell me about him. You can spin the injury argument all you like, but the Penguins hummed along without Crosby, Malkin and Staal for long stretches so save the injury excuse for the apologist round table discussions. Mismanagement of resources, weak bench management, puzzling choices, lack of coach-to-player communication, motivation, outdated and ill-fitting systems, unprepared (and yes, underachieving) players are the real problems of the team. Many of these can be fixed by putting a Coach in place that puts talent in position to succeed, armed with a game plan that matches their skill sets. That hasn’t happened for much of the last 2+ seasons.

Ask yourself this: What other organization can steeply raise prices across the board and deliver such an average product? Even worse than losing is that they’ve become BORING. From the General Manager, to the Coach and now finally tricked down to the ice, the team is void of flair, personality and FUN. That’s perhaps the biggest knock against the brand of hockey that the Jacques Martin era will be known for. Montreal is a city teeming with flair, fun and personality, and given how tightly woven the Habs are in the fabric of the city, their current state is a loose thread on the tapestry. Yet legions of people are willing to accept it? I understand “accepting it because you’re virtually powerless to change it” (you’re not, by the way), but I cannot comprehend anybody “accepting it because you think it’s good enough”. By the way, the Canadiens have played many poor games this year, and currently have the worst home record in the league. Some reward for those people who scramble to find ways, despite the rapidly escalating prices, to go to the Bell Center and buy up all things Canadiens.

Rise Together? I guess if you’re at the bottom, then there’s nowhere to go but up, right? Maybe this has been the plan all along.

Yet as team owner Geoff Molson stands pat, offering his support for the General Manager, Head Coach, and Gomez alike, it seems all too clear that profits are a higher priority for the powers that be than winning is. This should come as no surprise. All outward appearances seem to indicate that making the playoffs and reaping pure profit from a couple home games is the goal. They tell us that the Cup is the goal, but as we all know, actions speak louder than words. In my last post, I’ve clearly showed that winning the Cup is a matter of home ice advantage. Without it, chances of glory are slim, yet that doesn’t stop pie-eyed optimists from believing that “anything is possible”. I don’t hold that belief against anybody, because anything is possible if you want to get in to semantics, but with just one of the last 34 Cup finalists winning it all (that’s 3%) without entering the playoffs with home ice advantage, I tend to put my stock in the overwhelming stat that has been proven over a long period of time.

And so we’ve become very good at limbo, because we happily bend over backwards to make time for this team, spend money on it and invest our hopes in it. What a pity.

Sadly, the Canadiens, through spin, media mouthpieces, marketing and PR have successfully lowered the bar to the point where making the playoffs is seen as some great accomplishment, and as a result, fans now believe that an upset or two (and even near-upsets) are highwater benchmarks of success.

Many of us know better. Unfortunately, it seems that not enough do.That, my friends, is the magic of good marketing.

“The plan was not to sit back at all. The best defense is offense.” — Jacques Martin

Martin has tried to sell us many good yarns this year, but this one is really a shocker coming from the King of Passive hockey. But if we are to believe what the Coach said in the aftermath of a game blown to the Buffalo Sabres last night, then certainly he must have recent memories and statistical evidence track record that speaks to that belief, right?

Let’s take a look and see what the Coach may be talking about.

In 2009-10, his first season in Montreal, the Canadiens scored 217 goals. That was good for 10th overall in the Eastern Conference, 23rd overall in the NHL and the 2nd lowest of any Eastern playoff team. I know, I know. The Canadiens went to the Eastern Conference Finals, so stuff it, right? Blah blah blah. Spare me your circular logic. As I’ve said before, we know how the Canadiens got to the Eastern Conference Finals and it had little to do with a spectacular offense.

In 2010-11, his second season in Montreal, the Canadiens actually slipped to 216 goals, good for 12th in the Eastern Conference, 24th overall in the NHL and the LOWEST of any Eastern Conference playoff team. I can hear the homers already: “But they took the eventual champs to overtime in game 7…and the injuries…..THE INJURIES! ARGH!!!!”. Where’s the snooze button, because I’m going to push it. Hard. There are no moral victories in the playoffs, and there were plenty of other teams that had more injuries than the Habs last season. In fact, the Canadiens were pretty much right in the middle of the pack in terms of man games lost to injury.

This season, the Canadiens have scored 42 goals through 17 games. That’s 2.47 goals per game on average, and projects out to 203 goals for the season. So if the Coach think that a best defense is a good offense, his team is going in the wrong direction, and has been going in the wrong direction for what is now a 3rd consecutive season. The addition of Erik Cole, a full season of Max Pacioretty and a bounce back season for some vets were supposed to set the stage of a more potent offense, was it not? Aside from Markov, who has been a gigantic question mark for many months now, the team has been relatively healthy. Cammalleri and Kostitsyn have missed a few games apiece, but certainly not enough to be the sole reason for the Habs’ continued inability to score goals.

Going back to what the Coach said: “The plan was not to sit back at all. The best defense is offense.”…how exactly does the Coach practice what he preaches? As the moribund powerplay continues to circle the drain, the Coach still affords Mathieu Darche precious minutes while other more talented, more deserving players sit and watch from the bench. Does having Tomas Plekanec on the point help or hurt? Does the Coach get his team to continually push the pace? Does he encourage and motivate them to play the same way that put them in a position to have a 2-goal lead to begin with? Or rather does he stand pat while his passive 1-2-2 system kills any offensive momentum his team may have had? If he in fact does not preach sitting back to protect a lead, then why does he continue to let it happen? It’s his job to change his players’ habits, is it not? If the players come out and talk about how they sat back, yet the Coach says that wasn’t the plan, then where’s the disconnect from the Coach to the players? Are the players stubborn? Incompetent? Is the Coach’s message not getting through? Is it not properly delivered? No matter, getting the best from his team and ensuring that his message is getting through is HIS job.

We’ve taken a look at some of the things we can see with our own eyes, but now let’s delve a little deeper in to some stats to try and help paint a clearer picture.
The Canadiens have 14 third period goals this season, which puts them in a logjam with the likes of Phoenix, Columbus, Nashville, Winnipeg and Detroit for 21st in the NHL. Red Wings aside, those aren’t the teams I think of when I think of “offense” and pushing the pace. Until last night, the Canadiens were actually 5-0 when leading after two periods, so a 5-0-1 record this morning should not be the end of the world, and truly it isn’t. The record and team are not on trial here. But that 5-0-1 record still only places them 18th overall in the league when leading after two periods. Since a near-perfect record ranks them a mediocre 18th, it can only mean that more than half of the teams in the league have had more leads to protect after two periods than the Habs, which speaks to the Habs overall inability to score at any point in the game. But the Habs ranking of 21st in the NHL in 3rd period goals means two thirds of the league still manages to score more goals in the final frame. When you put these seemingly disparate pieces of information together, it tells me that the Canadiens don’t push the pace in the third period, whether they are leading or trailing (Habs remain winless when trailing after two periods with an 0-6-2 record) and do in fact sit on leads going in to the third period when they have a lead to protect.

The final analysis says that if Jacques Martin believes that the best defense is a good offense, he does almost nothing to prove it. Is the Coach simply stating what he believes, but is unable to implement? Or is he trying to make us believe (similar to him telling us that young defensemen are to blame, or that his team plays puck possession hockey) what he wants us to believe? Given his track record, we know he’ll probably throw his friend and boss, General Manager Pierre Gauthier to the wolves for failing to provide enough talent. Hmm, that is curious, isn’t it? Tomas Plekanec, Michael Cammalleri, Brian Gionta, Max Pacioretty, Lars Eller, David Desharnais, Erik Cole, Andrei Kostitsyn, PK Subban, Yannick Weber, Raphael Diaz…does that sound like a talentless roster to you? Is that a list of names that evokes “can’t score goals” to you? It’s not to me.

Take your pick of the following potential reasons:

• Markov isn’t going to be back any time soon
• Subban’s back injury will keep him out of the lineup for a while
• Yemelin isn’t going to make the team
• Nothing to see here, just a depth signing
• Something more – a trade – is in the works
• Weber has fallen out of favour
• None of the above

Whatever the reason for the signing, there will be no shortage of discussion and dissection for each reason…

What say you?

It’s looking like there will be precious few surprises at this year’s training camp, with the roster all but carved in stone already. The only lingering questions are that of the health of Lars Eller’s shoulder, and Andrei Markov’s knee. Recent reports suggest that Markov has suffered a set back in his rehab and has had another procedure done to correct the problem. If this report is true, it can’t be seen as good news. That Markov was not at the golf tournament to answer questions about his knee only adds fuel to that fire. Let’s wait and see what the Canadiens have to say, but from the sounds of it, and according to General Manager Pierre Gauthier, Markov is a question mark to start the season. As for Eller, he believes there’s a strong possibility that he’ll be ready to start the year. That’s certainly welcome news.

When we take a look at the Habs salary cap situation, we see that they are sitting on a small mountain of unused space; 3.98 million dollars of unused space to be almost precise, out of an available 64.3 million. It’s smart practice to not spend 100% of your space just in case you need to replace a pricey injured player, as the Habs did with Markov last year with the acquisition of James Wizniewski, or if you want to make some upgrades at the trade deadline. Considering that by the time that the trade deadline rolls around, the vast majority of a star player’s salary is already paid, is there really a need to preserve 4 million dollars of cap space? A star player (with a 6 million dollar salary) would only require about 1.3 million in available cap space. So what gives? Aren’t the Habs one of the league’s high rollers? With ticket and concession prices as high as they are, you’d like to think so, right?

So what would Gauthier’s response be if posed the question of why hasn’t he spent more freely?

Would he tell you that the team is fortunate enough to have key roles filled by young players that remain relatively inexpensive, and therefore the savings can be put to better use later in the season? A reasonable explanation I guess. Perhaps he doesn’t want to risk locking himself in to long term deals with players that he doesn’t view as core members of the team, and would prefer to be as flexible as possible when it comes to resigning Subban, Price, Gorges, and other young members of the team.

Would he tell you that he has full confidence in his current squad’s ability to compete at a high level, and wants to give this group a chance to excel before making changes? Also reasonable. We as fans like this group, don’t we? We can see them doing big things this year, right? After all, there’s no shortage of people that will tell you that they were 1 goal away from knocking out the Cup champs – without Markov, Gorges, Pacioretty, and with even more players hobbled with injuries (Wizniewski’s, Eller, Desharnais). Doesn’t this group deserve its fair shake?

Would he tell you that the season hasn’t started yet, and that there’s still time to make tweaks? This would be nothing more than lip service, and a simple deflection of the question. Any signings now would be from the scrap heap and would have no ramifications to the team’s long term future.

Would he tell you that he’s not 100% confident in Markov’s recovery, and would like to have a large chunk of cash available if he had to wheel & deal to replace him again? Doubtful, although, again, he did reveal that Markov may or may not be ready to start the year. Could he be more worried than he’s letting on?

Would he go on to reveal the nightmare scenario for Habs fans: that the Canadiens have an internal budget, regardless of how high the cap goes, and that they currently sit within 1-2 million of that number? Hmmm. This one is likely to ruffle the feathers of most readers.

Regardless of what the real answer is, there are a lot of Habs fans out there that have one eyebrow raised at the fact that the Canadiens haven’t spent to the cap. In recent years the Habs bumped their heads against the cap when stood up straight. But it wasn’t always that way.

Blame the economics of the league, blame the weakness of the Canadian dollar, blame the price of oil, blame whatever you want. Here are some facts that many Habs fans have probably long since forgotten, or never realized to begin with. Below is a listing of where Habs ranked in team payroll since 1998-99, which of course includes the free-spending capless days, as well as the system we currently know. I used Wikipedia and NHLnumbers.com to compile this data. You may use other sources, and the one that I used are by no means official numbers, but I do believe that they paint an accurate enough picture that even if they’re off just by a bit, you’ll get the idea.

Year         Payroll ranking
1998-99: 8th
1999-00: 11th
2000-01: 22nd
2001-02: 13th
2002-03: 12th
2003-04: 17th
2004-05: LOCKOUT
2005-06: 17th
2006-07: 9th
2007-08: 18th
2008-09: 6th
2009-10: 8th
2010-11: 7th
2011-12: 11th (projected)

From the above, two things become clear: the Habs have not always been high rollers. In fact, it’s only since 2008-09 that they’ve been a consistent top-10 team in terms of team payroll, but they have yet to crack the top 5 in the cap era. Previous to the lockout, they may have been subject to market and economic conditions that were beyond their control, and they were no doubt operating with an internal budget that restricted spending. But it’s a cop-out to say that the Canadian dollar was the one thing that sunk them. Since we love to compare ourselves to Toronto (what inferiority complex?), let’s look at how the Leafs spent vs how the Habs spent in the pre-lockout years:

Year
1998-99: Leafs – 34M vs Habs – 33.5
1999-00: Leafs – 34M vs Habs – 33.8
2000-01: Leafs – 41M vs Habs – 26.5
2001-02: Leafs – 51.6M vs Habs – 41.3
2002-03: Leafs – 65.1M vs Habs – 42.3
2003-04: Leafs – 62.5M vs Habs – 38.9

The Canadian dollar bottomed out in 2002; it cost over $1.60CDN to acquire one U.S. dollar. No doubt that hurts when salaries are paid out in American dollars. However, Toronto shares the same currency as we do in Montreal, so please go find another reason to explain why the Leafs payroll nearly doubled from 34 million in 1999-200 to over 65 million just 3 seasons later. They were spending over 50% more than the Canadiens were by that point. Why were the Habs – who have always been an expensive night out – unable to keep up with the Leafs? Were they unable? Or were they simply unwilling? The easy answer may be that the Canadiens are a tightly run organization that puts dollars and cents above wins and banners. Despite their glossy presentation, and the prestige of just being at one of their games, is it not possible that they are ruled by the shareholders desire for profits, the same as any corporation? If you think with your head, and not with your heart, the answer is a resounding yes. The heart says that the Canadiens belong to the fans, and as fans we want success at any cost, and that management OWES its fans. We pay for our tickets, our concessions, and our swag. We pay dearly for it. But we don’t sign the paychecks, and we don’t get to see the balance sheet….not that we all care to.

While the Canadiens are often referred to as the most prestigious team in hockey, they aren’t a bottomless pit of money. Well, maybe they are a bottomless pit of money, but perhaps ownership is more than reluctant to part with their riches. We should all brace ourselves for the day where the Habs are no longer a cap team, but rather a team that has to be mindful of what the shareholders want over what the fans want.

That day may already be here. Those days may have always been here. It’s a sobering thought, isn’t it? For some of you, I suppose you’ll think I’m nuts that the Habs are even close to the upper limits of their spending. Maybe I am, but you have to admit that given the evidence above, they have shown themselves to be a more frugal bunch over the years than we give credit for.

How do you explain the abnormally large chunk of cap space left over?

This brings us back to Gauthier’s latest signing.

As one of favorite players on the team, I badly wanted to see Gorges back. His mix of determination, character, leadership, and defensive talents make him one of those guys who you can’t win without. Guys like him can “will” a team to victory through sheer guts. There is, however, a point where giving Gorges too much money ends up hurting the Canadiens more than it helps. For as many positive qualities as he brings, there’s a ceiling for players that put up less than 20 points per season. Debate has raged for weeks on how high that ceiling is. Eventually Gorges will test that ceiling and the flames of debate will reignite.

The 1 year, $2.5 million dollar deal itself has left many, if not all fans scratching their sweaty heads. Why just one year? Where’s the long-term deal that would have seen Gorges in the bleu-blanc-rouge for the foreseeable future? We can conjure up all kinds of reasons why this deal is only delaying the inevitable – the eventual departure of the reliable defenseman. The fact is none of us were a part of the negotiations.

And while none of us are in Gorges’ or Gauthier’s head, most assumed that Gorges was happy in Montreal, and that the Habs were ready to move forward with Gorges as a part of their core for years to come. Now with the risk of losing him to unrestricted free agency looming in just under a year from now, many see a simple one year deal as a slap in the face to one of the team’s leaders in the dressing room, and a sure sign that Gorges already has July 1, 2012 circled on his calendar, and is dreaming of calling some other area home. I’m not sure that’s necessarily the case.

If Gorges was that insulted with either the term or the money presented to him by the Canadiens, he could have taken his chances in arbitration and hoped to be awarded more moolah. But he didn’t, which tells me that he’s still a team guy, still wants to play for the Canadiens, and will relish the chance to have a great season as a pending UFA. From there he’s free to hold the Canadiens over a barrel. From Gauthier’s perspective, he’s perhaps trying to save himself as much cap space as possible for when Price and Subban’s deals expire. With only Kostitsyn, Spacek and Gill with significant salaries due to come off the books next season, Gauthier will certainly have little wiggle room with which to work. Perhaps even more notably, as the current CBA expires at the conclusion of next season maybe Gauthier wants to see what type of framework he has to work with before locking in players to longer term deals.

Fans of Josh Gorges can breathe at least half a sigh of relief; the man is back with the Habs for at least one more season. Coming off major knee surgery that saw him play less than half of the 2010-2011 season, this is the most important season of Josh Gorges’ career. It’s to the Habs benefit that they will likely get Gorges at his healthy, motivated best, as he primes himself for unrestricted free agency.

Clearly rookie head coach Guy Carbonneau and General Manager Bob Gainey thought so, and awarded Guillaume Latendresse a 3-year contract worth $850,000 per season, which was the maximum allowable for a rookie. Immediately the skeptics voiced their concern that the Canadiens simply bowed to public and media pressure to keep the young francophone in Montreal. The cheerleader in this camp was Habs legend Patrick Roy, who stated that if Latendresse’s name was Smith, he would have been relegated to the minors.

The other popular refrain was that while Latendresse was the big body that the Canadiens badly needed on their top two lines, he should have served time in Hamilton under coach Don Lever…this camp was led by TSN analyst Pierre McGuire. After all, players don’t arrive in Montreal to learn; they arrive in Montreal to perform, where the pressure to win is the highest. The AHL and other “minor” leagues are where players go to learn to be well rounded. At least that’s the way it works in Montreal. While the skeptics were derided as being a bunch of scrooges, it wouldn’t take long for them to be proven right. While Latendresse scored 16, 16 and 14 goals in Montreal before his 22nd birthday, it was more than clear that he was an unpolished, unrefined hockey player that more often than not was lost on the ice. Those that demanded that he be given a permanent home in Montreal in the fall of 2006 blamed rotating linemates and a lack of ice time for his underwhelming presence on the ice. The truth is that Latendresse was a confused hockey player; yes part of the blame rests with Habs management for rushing him along, but much of it rests with Latendresse himself, who squandered each and every opportunity to better himself (i.e. skipping a preseason camp for young players in the summer of 2009).

Finally, on November 23, 2009, he was traded to the Minnesota Wild for Benoît Pouliot, another chronic underachiever. This trade was a classic ‘my problem for your problem’ scenario. Almost immediately, Latendresse showed a scorer’s touch, scoring 10 goals in his first 20 games with Minnesota, and going on to score 25 goals in 55 games over the remainder of 2009-10 season. Surely, those pumping Latendresse’s tires during his stay in Montreal felt vindicated in their belief in the young player, even as they continued to wipe the tears from their eyes over the trade. Meanwhile, Benoît Pouliot was busy mending a bum wrist, awaiting his debut with the tricolore. For his part, once he did return from a wrist injury Pouliot went on to score 15 goals in 39 games; 6 more than he had scored in 65 career games with the Wild. On the surface, it looked like a win-win trade. Except that the majority of Pouliot’s goals were scored during one hot streak which then quickly subsided. What we all know now is that when Pouliot isn’t scoring, he isn’t doing anything. At all. Except taking dumb penalties.

So, after scoring 24 points in 39 in his first half-season with Montreal (a statistic that flattered Pouliot’s overall quality of play), Pouliot showed his true colours by posting a flaccid 2 assists in 18 playoff games. Talk about being a passenger!

Here’s where rushing a player to the big show, then trading that player in an attempt to wash your hands of the problem that he had become morphs in to an even bigger problem. Not only did the Canadiens decide to keep Benoît Pouliot for the 2010-2011 season, they inexplicably gave him a $500,000 raise to $1.35M. There’s an argument to be made that the Habs had faith in his untapped abilities, and that he’d represent good value for the money. You could also say that you simply don’t give up on a kid who was drafted 4th overall (one place ahead of Carey Price). Fine, but the more plausible explanation is that the Canadiens were practicing “asset management”. Letting Pouliot walk after the 2009-2010 season would have meant trading Guillaume Latendresse for half a season (plus playoffs) of Benoît Pouliot. That would have caused a tremendous uproar and been a perceived stain on Gauthier’s resume. Quite simply, the Habs had to save face after trading away the media’s golden boy.

What this all boils down to is a single mistake made in 2006 – bowing to fan and media pressure in keeping an unprepared youngster in the highest pressure market in hockey. Because of that mistake, the Habs were forced to trade Latendresse away for another underachiever and then compounded the error by keeping Pouliot around for another year. By the time the 2011 draft had rolled around, Pouliot’s stock had fallen so far that General Manager Gauthier could not even secure a low-level draft choice for Pouliot’s negotiating rights. With Pouliot’s tenure with the Habs on life support, Gauthier let the clock expire. He did not tender Pouliot a qualifying offer, meaning that he will be an unrestricted free agent on July 1st. The lesson learned here should be player development. Unless you’re dealing with a known quantity, a sure-fire superstar like Sidney Crosby, like Steven Stamkos, like Matt Duchene, like Taylor Hall, all players should be mandated to spend at least one full season in the AHL or an equivalent training ground.

Guillaume Latendresse sprang from the ether to have a tremendous preseason. That’s all it took for the external pressure to build to the point where the Habs made a catastrophic decision with Latendresse. Who knows what may have become of Latendresse if he had been made to learn the professional game in Hamilton. He could have arrived in Montreal a smarter, better, stronger, more rounded player, playing his rookie season at 20 or 21 years old. Instead, he was a teenager who was granted the keys to the city for scoring a handful of meaningless goals.

There’s no doubt that a single mistake can have far reaching effects many years later and that it is not always simple or easy to recover from those mistakes. While the Habs saved faced and hoped for Pouliot to fulfill his potential, a roster spot was taken away from somebody else who could have had a more meaningful contribution to the Canadiens.

I’ll include each player’s cap hit, and make a couple assumptions, namely that Markov will sign for a 5.75M cap hit, that Gorges will also be back, at an undetermined cap hit, and that Mathieu Darche will occupy a full-time 4th line role, as opposed to being a part-timer.

From there, we’ll have a solid idea of where Gauthier will be able to spend – assuming there’s place left on the roster.

Forwards

1st line: Tomas Plekanec (5M cap hit), Mike Cammalleri (6M cap hit), winger to be named later. 1st line cap hit today: 11M

2nd line: Scott Gomez (7.357 cap hit), Brian Gionta (5M cap hit), Max Pacioretty (1.625 cap hit). 2nd line cap hit today: 13.982M

3rd line: Lars Eller (1.27M cap hit), Travis Moen (1.5M cap hit), Andrei Kostitsyn (3.25M cap hit). 3rd line cap hit today: 6.021M

4th line: David Desharnais (.75M cap hit), Mathieu Darche (.7M cap hit), winger to be named later (likely Ryan White- cap hit TBD). 4th line cap hit today: 1.45M

Total for 10 forwards: 32.453M

Defensemen

1st pair: Andrei Markov (5.75 cap hit), Josh Gorges (cap hit TBD). 1st pair cap hit today: 5.75M

2nd pair: Hal Gill (2.25M cap hit), P.K. Subban (.875 cap hit). 2nd pair cap hit today: 3.125M

3rd pair: Alexei Emelin (.984M cap hit), Jaroslav Spacek (3.83M cap hit). 3rd pair cap hit today: 4.814M

Total for 5 defensemen: 13.689M

Goaltending:

Carey Price (2.75M cap hit) Backup TBD.

Total for 1 goaltender: 2.75M.

Buyouts: .5M (Laraque)

Final Tally:

The Canadiens have currently spent, to the best of my knowledge $49.392 million on 10 forwards, 5 defensemen, and 1 goaltender. This leaves 14.608M for a top line winger, a 4th line winger (White), and 2 press box attendees. On defense, they have to account for Gorges, and Weber (or another 7th defenseman). Finally, a backup goalie would be required to fill out the 23 man roster.

While 14 million sounds like a lot, consider that Gorges will take at least 3.5 million of that. White will eat up .75M. 7th defensemen and press box forwards also come cheap; let’s account 3 million for those 3 guys on the generous end. That’s another 7.25 eaten up, leaving 7.36M for a top line winger, as well as some buffer space for injury call ups and perhaps an addition or two at the trade deadline.

We’ll see how things play out, but it’s clear that Gauthier has a bit of cash to play with, provided the Habs are going to be a cap team again this year.

What are your thoughts on the current roster and the remaining cap space?

1- Habs need size up front

Yes, Jagr is big, but so was Peter Popovic. When folks say that a team needs size, it’s also implied that the size comes with grit and nastiness. Jagr brings neither. The Habs need a guy who can throw a few punches, score goals and lay the body. Is Jagr that guy? Was he ever? Nope. Yes, he can protect the puck and stick handle and shoot. Big deal, so could Alex Kovalev.

2- Mercenaries needs not apply

Jagr apparently wants to play with 5 teams (Montreal, Detroit, New York, Pittsburgh, Washington). Note how they’re all deep-pocketed teams with the exception of Pittsburgh, who instead just happen to have (hopefully) a recovered Crosby, Malkin and Staal. Want a guaranteed all-star center? Sell your services to the Pens. Otherwise, he’s knocking on the door of teams he’s played for, or that have lots of cash. You want a guy with all world skill, size and previous chemistry with Plekanec? Then go get *gasp* Alex Kovalev (there’s that name again). At least we know he WANTS to be here. And he’d be cheaper. Crazy eh? We’ve been down this road once, and I’m dumbfounded that Habs fans want to venture down it again. Stay away from both players in fact. Besides, do we really have interest in a guy who’s trying to leverage teams and leagues against one another? It’s obvious that he’s trying to squeeze top dollar out of somebody, somewhere. Don’t take the bait.

3- Chemistry

The Habs are a tight room. Jagr’s mere presence throws that in to chaos with all the attention he’ll bring to himself. He can say all he wants that he’ll be a good soldier, and do his best to help the team. But we know that when things don’t go his way, he sulks, he pouts, and most importantly, he sucks. And he’ll drag his mates down with him. He doesn’t fit with this team in any way. If the NHL allowed for a “special teams player”, then maybe. If he had 6-8 minutes per night on the power play ONLY, then perhaps it could work. On a regular shift, he’s wasting everyone’s time.

4- “The System”

Has Jagr ever met his own goaltenders? Can he name one goalie for any team that he ever played for? How will this guy fare in a demanding Jacques Martin system that requires responsible play without the puck? That demands that he actually presents himself in the defensive zone? Jagr can’t spell backcheck if you spotted him the b-a-c-k-c-h-e-c. Backczech? No, thank you.

5- Endurance

He looked good in the Olympics and in the World Championships. Wonderful. He’s also been playing in the KHL for the past several years (for 10 million dollars per year I may add). The KHL is not nearly as rugged or grueling as the NHL is, especially today. There’s less travel and way less games. The KHL’s regular season weighs in at about 50 games. An NHL regular season consists of 82, an increase of more than 60%. Then there’s the playoffs where the tough really get going. The Bruins just played 25 games en route to a Cup win. Added to the 82 game regular season, they played 107 games. Roughly double that of the KHL schedule. How on earth does anyone have confidence that Jagr can simply step back in to NHL action – at 39 years of age, play in a defense-first system, and help the team in areas that he no longer excels in?

6- Habs need even-strength help

Jagr can certainly help a powerplay, I’ll admit that much. But the Habs don’t need help on the power play. They need to learn how to succeed at even strength. The Canadiens were among the very worst teams in the league at even strength scoring. In case you hadn’t noticed, the majority of a hockey game is played at even strength…you’d be well served, and the Bruins just amply proved, to be a team that does well 5-on-5. To do that, they need players who will drive the opposing net, and force other teams to think twice when they retrieve the puck in their corners. Does Jagr fit that bill? Only if you make him do that on your PS3.

It Makes No Sense

Even at a reasonable cap hit on a 1-year deal, I strongly believe that a gamble on Jagr is a wasted one. He addresses none of the Canadiens needs, while at the same time creating new problems and potential controversies. I believe Pierre Gauthier would be wise to give the “thanks but no thanks” reply to Jagr’s agent Petr Svoboda. I think too many Habs fans are under the spell that he can come back in to the NHL and be a 40 goal, 100 point guy again. He can’t. Not in Montreal, not under Jacques Martin, not at 40 years old. He’s not Teemu Selanne. The Habs don’t have Bobby Ryan, Ryan Getzlaf, or Corey Perry, so don’t cite The Finnish Flash as a guy who can still bring it. This isn’t to say that Jagr can’t fit in with the Pens, or Caps or elsewhere on his wish list. It just can’t work in Montreal. He’s too much of a me-first mercenary that completely flies in the face of the Habs style.

So here’s your turn. Tell me how Jaromir Jagr can help the Habs.